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Tailor-made laws in the Western Balkans – 





State capture in the Western Balkan countries has been ignored since the launch of the region’s 
EU accession process, despite the many examples highlighted by civil society and independent 
media. While the EU first acknowledged the clear signs of state capture in an official document 
in 2016, Western Balkan political elites had already built powerful networks of corrupt interests 
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magine you are the leader of a corrupt political elite in a Western Balkan country 
transitioning to a consolidated democracy. You are pressured to fight “widespread 
corruption in all areas”, but you cannot afford to lose control of the power you have 
acquired over the years. How do you navigate away from all that pressure? 
Here is a guide that will help buy you some time… decades literally. 
First, you start fighting petty corruption. You will need to show results, especially to 
international community and the European Union (EU), who are offering financial support to 
your country. This is not all bad, as you will soon realise that fighting corrupt low-ranking 
officials does not threaten your position. 
This will not last long, however, maybe a decade or two, depending on how badly you want the 
reward of EU membership that is being dangled by Brussels. The EU will make its financial 
support conditional on ‘democratic laws’. Have no worries! They will only look at laws on paper, 
not the quality of their implementation. 
This will buy you another decade or so, time that you can use to gain full control over the 
institutions implementing those nice laws on paper, to match your interests of course. Beware, 
this is a historic moment – it is the start of state capture by you and your increasingly powerful 
network. But it is not yet the ‘state of the art’ of state capture. 
Over time, more pressure will come from international community. You and your network have 
grown so much that you are causing trouble beyond your state borders. Internationals now 
want results in practice, the fine laws implemented and even more – they want you to fight 
“high-level corruption”. Put on a good show for them! Arrest somebody… you can always 
release them later. 
This is a crucial moment for you as a corrupt network. It is time to finish your masterpiece. 
For decades you had to break the laws, you had to control processes and institutions so that 
they implemented the laws to serve your interests. But guess what? You don’t have to do that 
anymore. Instead, you tailor the laws to match your corrupt interests. 
1. Urban legend or reality? 
Is it possible to make laws that are tailored to corrupt ambitions? Has state capture in 
the Western Balkans really evolved to that level?1 How does it work? What does it take 
for a well-connected group to control processes and outcomes serving its corrupt 
interests? 
 
1 State capture in the WB region was long considered an urban legend until recently when it was exposed in North 
Macedonia’s Gruevski regime (2015/2016). The 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy found that several 
WB countries continued to show clear symptoms and various degrees of state capture (p. 3), while two years later 
the EC stated that  “today the [WB] countries show clear elements of state capture, including links with organised 
crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well as a strong entanglement of public 
and private interests”. 
I 
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Unfortunately, tailor-made laws are a reality. 
Let’s say your country is about to become a NATO member and you have a lot of old weapons 
and ammunitions that you need to get rid of. Why not make some money out of them? You 
just need the right ‘war dogs’ to repack and ship that ammunition under lucrative contracts 
made possible by orders from your Minister for Defence. To keep costs low and your profits 
high, you build a (sort of) mobile factory employing low-skilled workers, and even children. 
However, if anything goes wrong – a deadly explosion for example, that destroys an entire 
village – you will have to protect your minister and yourself. 
Although you did everything right by taking advantage of the legal loopholes, you still had to go 
a lot of trouble because of a Prosecutor General who was not on your side. How many times 
and for how long can you use the legal gaps to your benefit? Imagine if there was a way for you 
to embody your corrupt interests in the law itself. You wouldn’t have to bother with 
prosecutors, because your interests are now legal. 
2. Tailor-made laws, Albanian style 
Would anyone be suspicious if a seemingly well-intended draft law that limits the 
expansion of a harmful industry, such as the gambling industry, ends up doing exactly 
the opposite due to last-minute amendments adopted by the parliament? 
The gambling industry has been a serious concern in Albania. Not only for the negative 
socioeconomic effects it has on youngsters or its clear links to domestic violence, but also in 
the context of organised crime and money laundering. At the end of 2015, the government 
announced a law that would limit the effects of this industry through higher taxation (25% tax), 
rigid criteria of 200 m distance from education or religious institutions, and through limiting 
the number of stations up to a maximum of 500 units per gambling licence. However, 24 hours 
before the parliament’s plenary session, a few amendments dramatically changed the law and 
provided for a massive expansion of gambling in Albania over the next two years. The 
amendments included: i) a reduction of the tax to 15% on gross revenues; ii) a reduction of the 
distance criteria to 100 m; and ii) a doubling of the number of gambling stations per licence to 
1000 units.2 
Investigative media have collected evidence that the legislation adopted in 2015 has directly 
contributed to the expansion of the gambling industry. In 2017, the profit generated by this 
sector increased by 68% compared to 2015. Powerful interests of the gambling industry had 
succeeded in influencing the parliamentary majority, as Prime Minister Edi Rama himself 
admits. 
 
2 In 2015 a gambling company licence cost ca €1.6 million for 10 years. By doubling the number of stations (from 
500 to 1000 units) the price of the 10-year licence decreased in practice by 50%. 
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And there are more examples. Let’s talk about the public private partnerships (PPPs) and 
concessions, which are now even dubbed “the new mantra of grand corruption” in 
Albania. 
In its 2018 report on Albania, the European Commission questioned the technical skills and 
capacities of state institutions to design, assess and monitor the more than 200 approved PPPs 
and concessions. Civil society and independent media have exposed facts which demonstrate 
that many of the PPP projects were part of a grand corruption scheme. This is especially the 
case for those PPPs approved by special laws, such as law no. 52/2019 date 18.07.2019 for the 
construction of the Milot-Balldren highway and its 13-year concession, or the PPP for the 
construction of the National Theatre in Tirana.3 Other highly suspicious PPP projects were 
contracted in healthcare, road maintenance, waste management and other areas between 
2014 and 2019. 
This PPP boom was enabled through amendments made to the law ‘On concessions and PPPs’ 
in 2014 and 2015. For example, the 2013 law on concessions and PPPs had a mechanism that 
awarded a 10% bonus for unsolicited proposals by private entities in the hydropower sector. 
This provision was criticised by the EU at that time. Yet, instead of removing the 10% bonus for 
unsolicited proposals, as requested by the EU, the ruling coalition did precisely the opposite. 
Parliament expanded the 10% bonus for unsolicited proposals to all areas of the law and hence 
allowed for the boom of lucrative PPP and concession contracts to a network of clients.4 
These are just a few examples of tailor-made laws5 that illustrate to what level state 
capture may develop.6 But what does it take to build such a powerful network of political 
and economic interests that controls processes and outcomes to their benefit? 
3. Control of corrupt networks over the legislative process 
If we look back at the past 30 years in the region, we realise that the corrupt network of political 
and economic interests has been more innovative than our measures to counter them. The 
current situation of state capture in the Western Balkan countries has been planned by 
networks of illegitimate interests for some 10 years. At that time, most WB countries were 
ticking as many boxes as possible to sign association agreements with the EU as well as to satisfy 
the various recommendations made in the country reports. Meanwhile, not only did the EU 
 
3 Read also Exit.al “Albanian National Theatre Building – Suspicious Tender Tailored to Government’s Usual 
Contractors”. Source: https://exit.al/en/2019/08/05/albanian-national-theater-building-suspicious-tender-
tailored-to-governments-usual-contractors/  
4 This move was subsequently criticised by all EC reports on Albania until 2019 when it was finally abolished. See 
EC report for Albania 2015 (p. 34) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_ 
documents/2015/20151110_report_albania.pdf.  
5 A Transparency International research project in WB and Turkey has analysed numerous tailor-made laws over 
the period 2008-19. The database of tailor-made laws will be published in 2020. The author of this article has led 
the research on tailor-made laws in Albania over the last decade, hence this article draws on this experience.  
6 Between 2016 and 2019 Albania dropped 23 places according to TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Source 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019?/news/feature/cpi-2019.  
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have no monitoring mechanisms in place, but it was also overly preoccupied with political 
stability and security in the WB region. 
This created a perfect environment for corrupt networks to plan their next decade. The further 
weakening of oversight institutions was the first step towards state capture and tailor-made 
laws. Logically, decision-making processes are more easily captured with fewer political actors, 
flawed checks and balances mechanisms that keep governments accountable, and strongmen 
silencing the media. 
The 2008 constitutional amendments in Albania did precisely that. They introduced an electoral 
system that favours establishment parties (as opposed to new or smaller parties) and bolsters 
political leaders’ control of parliamentary groups. This paved the way to negotiate tailor-made 
laws within a small group of powerful people. Further, the 2008 amendments also affected the 
checks and balances mechanisms, offered more space for the PM to control the parliamentary 
majority by means of a confidence vote – failure of which would dissolve the parliament, and 
allowed for a simple majority to elect the President of the Republic, an institution whose 
independence provided for some of the checks and balances instruments. Additionally, the 
parliamentary majority could now reject the president’s veto of laws passed by the parliament 
with a simple majority, instead of a qualified majority. 
With a powerful prime minister dominating the legislative branch, and an already inefficient 
system of oversight institutions, the next step was the independent media. An efficient strategy 
to control the media is by killing media pluralism, decreasing the number of ‘players’ 
(ownership concentration) and concentrating economic interests in just a few hands. 
Considering the economic interests and political ties of media owners – most of the mainstream 
media did not resist the control.7 The fight is still on for control of online media, which has 
exposed many corruption scandals in the last few years. 
Albania’s path to tailor-made laws and state capture does not differ much from that of 
Serbia, Montenegro, or even Gruevski’s regime in North Macedonia. 
Years of increasing state capture, abuse of power, and strongman tactics employed by 
Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia and Milo Djukanović in Montenegro have tipped those countries 
over the edge. For the first time since 2003, they are no longer categorised as democracies 
according to Freedom House.8 The 2020 Nations in Transit report highlights the domination of 
the executive over the legislative branch in the WB region and other countries through 
“patterns of rushed law making”, “restrictions on the opposition’s participation” and the very 
“hollowing out of Parliaments” which altogether have made a mockery of the legislative 
process. Tailor-made laws therefore serve the corrupt political and economic networks 
 
7 EC reports have repeatedly urged the country to address increasing media ownership concentration since 2016. 
According to the Media ownership Monitor project (MOM Albania) the families, owning the biggest TV media 
companies not only dominate the audience but also benefit from more than half of the advertisement 
expenditures. See https://albania.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/media-concentration/ and https://albania.mom-
rsf.org/en/findings/advertisingmarket/.  
8 Freedom House “Nations in Transit 2020 – Dropping the democratic façade”, p.2. Source: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade. 
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throughout the region through similar forms (e.g. legal vacuum, PPPs and concessions, special 
laws) and even create conditions for transnational and other alliances. 
A paralysed system of checks and balances, ineffective oversight institutions, captured media 
and, not least, an unambitious EU accession process have all helped WB corrupt networks seize 
not only states, but even to reach for society capture.9 
So, what is the next step for state capture networks? 
4. Divide and rule 
As anti-corruption researchers and practitioners are analysing the past processes, state capture 
networks in the WBs and other countries in Europe are planning their next decade. Alternative 
facts and populism, or foreign influences in the WBs as an alternative to EU integration suggest 
that the strategy is ‘divide and rule’. They have reached the point where their corrupt interests 
are being enshrined in and protected by law. Their goal now is to make their ‘investment’ not 
simply legal, but also broadly supported by their constituencies of citizens. To achieve this goal, 
WB state capture networks are already also using the EU’s internal weaknesses and the 
democratic backsliding in various member states (Hungary, Poland),10 thus profoundly 
redefining the EU’s relationship with the WB region. It is for this reason that the fight against 
state capture networks needs to be profoundly redefined too. The EU will be unable to counter 
state capture networks in the WBs if it does not also target state capture and democratic 
backsliding among its own member states. 
Western Balkan anti-corruption stakeholders need to become more far-sighted than they have 
been in the last few decades. The fight against corruption and state capture has been 
predominantly focused on the consequences, rather than on the evolving mechanisms of the 
phenomenon. We have been dealing mostly with what was happening recently rather than 
what was being projected for the next decade. Above all, we have observed and struggled to 
fight the phenomenon in isolation and without considering its enablers across different 
branches of power and those within the space between the state, economy and society. While 
it takes courage to ‘go’ at these levels, we cannot afford to lose more time. And we certainly 
cannot afford to lose our biggest allies – the citizens. 
 
 
9 See “The UK and the future of the Western Balkans” House of Lords paper, January 2018, p. 31 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/53/53.pdf.  
10 FH’s Nations in Transit 2020 notes that Poland has already dropped out of the Consolidated Democracies 
category and became a Semi-Consolidated Democracy this year, while Hungary dropped to Hybrid Regime 
together with Serbia and Montenegro. See “Nations in Transit 2020 – Dropping the democratic façade”, p. 3. 
Source: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade. 
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5. How to prevent tailor-made laws? 
An efficient, transparent and high-integrity parliamentary procedure to scrutinise and 
adopt draft legislation by the parliaments of consolidated democracies usually takes 
three to four months, at least. During 2015-19 the Parliament of Albania adopted an 
average of 268 legal acts (laws, resolutions, decisions etc.) a year.11 This means that the 
average time for reviewing, consulting, amending and finally adopting one draft law in 
the Parliament of Albania was about half a working day. 
The substantial difference between a high-integrity law-making process and that of Albania (or 
any other Western Balkan country) does not lie in the technical capacities of the parliaments. 
Rather, it is the correct application of the democratic principles, transparent and participatory 
processes, and the very existence of checks and balances mechanisms that make the 
difference. Spending millions of euros on assistance missions to improve the technical 
capacities of a legislative body is completely irrational if Western Balkan countries continue to 
ignore the application of those ‘time-consuming’ principles that consolidated democracies 
apply strictly to the process of law making. 
Ensuring an open and democratic milieu for processes, institutions, societal players and 
constructive interactions to review and adopt legislation is therefore necessary. Many tailor-
made laws have been approved either through complete lack of transparency in the law-
making process or by paying lip service to the consultation process, but without reflecting its 
essence – public feedback. The EU has often tolerated that or when it did not, Brussels was told 
that “conducting consultations does not mean we have to agree”. Indeed, we don’t have to, 
but only if we are observing legitimacy, integrity, public interests and the rule of law. The strict 
implementation of these foundations and other principles of democracy – participation, 
accountability, control of power abuse, transparency and others – will help us dismantle the 
mechanism that led to the emergence of tailor-made laws, the gravest form of state capture. 
While the European Commission’s 2018 paper was a welcome step in the Western Balkan’s 
rule of law quest, many of its instruments such as advisory missions and the trial monitoring of 
serious corruption remained on paper.12 Furthermore, its flagship initiatives failed to grasp the 
nature of state capture networks in the region and their evolving character, culminating with 
degraded law-making processes dominated by autocratic leaders. 
Moreover, state capture was not even mentioned in the EC’s 2020 revised accession 
methodology, although some of its initiatives go in the right direction, such as better 
 
11 A total of 279 acts were approved by the Parliament in 2019, 274 in 2018, 246 in 2017, 259 in 2016 and 281 in 
2015. Library of acts of the Assembly of Albania. Source: https://www.parlament.al/LibrariaAkteve.  
12 See EC Communication “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the 
Western Balkans”, 6 February 2018, p. 10 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ 
communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf) and its Action Plan, page 1 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/annex-communication-credible-enlargement-
perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf).  
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streamlining of the economic governance criteria as part of the Fundamentals.13 The EU must, 
however, go far beyond the set of scattered measures that ignore the evolving mechanism of 
state capture in the Western Balkans, its enablers across the space between the state, economy 
and society, and the influence of EU member states backsliding into hybrid regimes. Even more 
importantly, it should stop turning a blind eye to the breach of democracy in Western Balkan 
countries and their fake progress towards EU membership. 
 
13 See the EC 2020 Communication “Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western 
Balkans”. 
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